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Abstract
Employing 1056 A-share listed companies in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2001 to 2007, 
we analyse empirically the influence of financial 
characteristics and corporate governance on propensity to 
pay cash dividends of companies. The result shows that 
in the related indexes of the financial characteristics of 
companies, the company size, cash flow, asset liquidity, 
profitability as well as whether cash dividends are paid in 
the previous year are positively correlated with propensity 
to pay cash dividends of companies. Investment 
opportunity and debt ratio are negatively correlated 
with the propensity to pay cash dividends of companies. 
Growth has uncertain influence on the propensity 
to pay cash dividends. In the corporate governance 
characteristics, existence of controlling shareholders, state-
owned shareholder as the largest shareholder, the size of 
the board of directors, top-management compensation and 
listing factors in other markets are positively correlated 
with the propensity to pay cash dividends of companies. 
Tradable share ratio and CEO duality factor are negatively 
correlated with the propensity to pay cash dividends of 
companies. Independent director factor has uncertain 
influence on the propensity to pay cash dividends of 
companies. In general, financial characteristics shows 
that Chinese listed companies have the capability to pay 
cash dividends, but the corporate governance factors have 
negative influence on the cash dividend payment of listed 
companies. 
Key words: The propensity to pay cash dividends; 
The company factor; Financial characteristics; Corporate 
governance
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INTRODUCTION
How much cash should firms give back to their 
shareholders? Why do some firms pay cash dividends 
while others do not? Why do some firms pay out a big 
fraction of their earnings as dividends while others only 
a small one? What percentage of their earnings paid is 
appropriate? What are the determinants of propensity 
to pay cash dividends? Dividend policy has been paid 
extensive attention because it has influence on the 
reasonable distribution of interests of listed companies 
between shareholders and firms (as retained earnings). It is 
also called “Dividend Puzzle” because a general dividend 
mode can’t be found (Black, 1976). 
Since the publication of seminal paper of Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) irrelevance propositions, many 
financial economists has been wrestling with “the 
Puzzle”. A lot of dividend literature has proposed a host 
of explanations to it. Such as: agency costs theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982), signaling hypothesis 
(Lintner, 1956; Miller and Modigliani, 1961), “bird-
in-the-hand”hypothesis (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; 
Bhattacharya, 1979), tax client effect theory (Brennan, 
1970), and catering theory of dividends (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a, 2004b).In general, the literature focuses 
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on  what factors influence dividend-policy-making and 
how the different factors impact on the dividend-policy-
making in different way. 
Chinese financial market is an emerging market and 
the history of Chinese stock market is shorter: Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange were 
founded in 1990 and 1991 respectively. However, the 
number of listed firms grows very quickly (table 1) and 
the total market value has increased to 32.71 trillion RMB 
(about 4.5 trillion dollar) in December 31, 2007. Until 
now, lots of papers have investigated on the dividend 
policy of American and European financial market deeply. 
Relatively little research has yet been published studying 
the cash dividends policy of Chinese listed firms. 
Table 1
Number of Listed Firms
1990   10               8   2           10  
1991   14               8   6           14  
1992   53             29 24           53                       18 
1993 183 106 77         183          3         34    6
1994 291 171         120         227          6         54    4
1995 323 188         135         242        11         58  12
1996 530 293         237         431        14         69  16
1997 745 383         362         627        17         76  25
1998 851 438         413         727        18         80  26
1999 949 484         465         822        19         82  26
2000 1088 572         516         955        19         86  28
2001 1160 646         514       1025        23         88  24
2002 1224 715         509       1085        28         87  24
2003 1287 780         507       1146        30         87  24
2004 1377 837         540       1236        31         86  24
2005 1381 834         547       1240        32           86  23
2006 1434 842         592       1287        38         86  23
2007 1550 860         684       1396        45         86  23
In China, the dividend puzzle is even deeper as 
expected. Some papers mainly focus on the explanation 
to the dividend policy and description to the current 
situation of the dividend policy (Wei, 1998; Li, 1999; Lv, 
1999). The related research finds some characteristics in 
the dividend policy of Chinese listed companies, which 
are severe phenomena: not to pay dividends, many 
methods to pay dividends and less cash dividends to be 
paid. Meanwhile, the research shows that cash dividend is 
the main dividend payout method in the foreign western 
country’s listed companies (Yuan, 2001). In American 
stock market, cash dividend had been being the main 
method to pay dividends until the middle of 1980’s. 
Stock repurchase became the important method to pay 
dividends after middle of 1980’s (Allen and Michaely, 
2002). The European stock market also shows the same 
trend to American market (Eije and Megginson, 2006). 
Using stock as bonus share, share allotment and some 
other methods in China are not seen as the behavior of 
dividends payment by international investors. The quality 
and purity don’t have the same general magnitude with 
cash dividend. Some researches show that the dividend 
yield in China is only 0.72% higher than the interest 
rate of current deposit, even less than a half of 1.17% of 
interest rate of time deposit in three months. For example, 
in Wuliangye’s (SZ000858) profit distribution plan of 
2008, only 0.5 RMB per 10 shares (including tax) were 
paid as cash bonus dividends. The dividends shareholders 
get are not higher than bank interest. It shows that the 
cash dividends in Chinese stock market actually only has 
symbolic meaning (Gao, 2002). The other main methods 
to pay dividends is stock repurchase in the western 
countries, which is used seldom due to the regulations of 
law. Cash dividends policy shows the operation situation 
of listed companies and impacts the stock price, so it has 
significant meaning to listed companies. However, what 
factors impact the propensity to pay cash dividends of 
Chinese listed companies and what cause propensity not 
to pay cash dividends of listed companies?
The research on determinants of cash dividend policy 
begins with dividend equalization concept from Linter 
(1956), who thought dividend changes depended on the 
dividend level in the previous year and current earnings 
and the partial adjustment on the basis of the target of 
fixed dividend payout ratio. By researching American 
listed companies, Baker et al (2001) found that the main 
influencing factors to select cash dividend policy were 
the past dividend payout situation, profit stability and 
current and expected return level. Allen and Michaely 
(2002) thought that profitability of company, company 
size, debt ratio and company growth had important 
influence on the dividend payout policy. Some scholars 
did some research on the factors to impact cash dividend 
policy. For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
they used inter-temporal model to prove the minority 
shareholders’ optimum selection to dividend policy 
and the dividend compensation function of dividends 
to majority shareholders on the basis of dividend 
policy and the agency problem between majority and 
minority shareholders. DeAngleo et al (2004) thought 
that dividend payout policy decision had highly and 
obviously positively correlated with the proportion of 
earned interests in the holder’s interests or total assets. 
Farinha (2003) proved that dividend payout ratio had 
obvious U-type relation with the equity percentage of 
insiders by the data from UK. However, it is few to do the 
research from the view of cash dividend policy. Xing Liu 
etc. (1997) did some research and found that the factors 
to impact cash dividend policy were investment value 
factors of companies, profitability factor of companies, the 
long-term development confidence factor of companies 
and asset liquidity factor of companies. Lv and Wang 
(1999)’s research data in 1997 and 1998 showed that cash 
dividend policy was mainly impacted by company size, 
shareholders’ interests, profitability, liquidity, agency cost, 
state-owned and legal-person holding degree, debt ratio, 
and some other factors. Yi (2008) thought that the capital 
factors influenced cash dividend were net cash flow of 
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current and past business activities. Yang (2008) found 
that cash dividend payout ratio was negatively correlated 
with enterprise value and the proportion of shares held by 
management. Tang and Zhou (2005) got the conclusion 
different from the foreign researches, which were that 
non-tradable shareholders in the listed companies had 
the propensity to pay cash dividend; and methods of 
administrative supervision to the market had big influence 
on the dividend policy. Whereas, there is a lack of the 
complete and systematic research on influencing factors 
to pay cash dividends in Chinese listed companies, so we 
hope to research on it further in this article.
We examine the Propensity to Pay Cash Dividends of 
Chinese Listed Companies over the period 2001-2007.
We start our analysis from 2001 for three reasons. First, 
this is a historically logical date to begin, since this was 
when China joined the WTO. This means China has fully 
decided to adopt the world common market-oriental rules. 
The second reason for beginning in 2001 is empirical; 
prior to that date, the database used provides less than 
comprehensive coverage of Chinese listed firms. Third, 
Gang Wei (2003) has researched the issue in the period 
of 1995-2001, so we hope we can provide more new 
evidence. We conclude the study with data in 2007, since 
this was the final year that we can get the completed data. 
The factors to impact cash dividend policy of 
companies are state factor, industry factor and company 
factor. The state factor is macro factor including influences 
of macro economy and policies and regulations, but there 
is a lack of evident quantitative index to state factor in 
the current research literature. Industry factor is meso 
factor, of which influence produces different researching 
results. Some reserch show that industry factor impacts 
dividend policy (Smith, 1992). Some also show that 
variable industry similarity but not the industry itself 
results in the similarity of dividend policy in the same 
industry (Rozeff, 1982). Company factor is the micro 
factor, which is the direct and the most important factor 
to impact cash dividend policy. That is because the own 
differences of different companies result in their different 
dividend policy. Therefore, in this article, with a view of 
company factor, we divide it into financial characteristics 
and corporate governance; try to analyze their influence 
on cash dividend policy, and study systematically on cash 
dividend policy of Chinese listed companies by theoretical 
analysis and empirical test. The arrangement below in 
this article is as following. The second part is theoretical 
analysis and research hypothesis. In the theory, we analyze 
financial characteristics and corporate governance’s 
influence on the propensity to pay cash dividend policy 
of listed companies. The third part is research and design 
including variable definition, model specification and 
data explanation. The fourth part is to make an empirical 
analysis, meanwhile analyze the empirical result and make 
stability test. The fifth part is conclusion.
1 .  THEORETICAL ANALYSIS  AND 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
The company factor is the most significant factor which 
impacts cash dividend policy. The state and industry 
factors impact by changing the corporate internal 
structure. In this article, the company factor is divided 
into financial characteristics and corporate governance. 
Financial characteristics decide if the listed companies 
have the capability to pay cash dividends. That is to say 
they can or can’t. Corporate governance decides if the 
listed companies are willing to pay cash dividends. That is 
to say they are willing or aren’t.
1.1  Financial Characteristics
Financial characteristics are the integrated reflection to 
the management condition of the company. The change 
of different influencing factors makes the amount of 
capital changed which may be used to pay cash dividend, 
so as to impact to make cash dividend policy. Financial 
characteristics have 8 factors including company size, cash 
flow, asset liquidity, investment opportunity, profitability, 
growth, debt ratio and stability of the dividend policy. 
1.1.1  Company Size
The company size shows the strength of a company, 
presents how much the capital, profit and spendable 
integrated resources are, and decides the development 
potential in the future, so that it can impact cash dividend 
policy. Large-size Company usually has been developed 
in the mature stage, so the equity expanding space is 
smaller, cash flow is more stable, capital is more enough, 
and meanwhile, expanding desire is weaker. In order 
to maintain own mature image and protect minority 
shareholders’ interests, they usually have the propensity 
to pay cash dividends (Smith, 1992). Chang et al (1990) 
thought that it was also easy for large-size companies to 
get external capital due to their better commodity credit or 
honor. The dependence to internal financing is not strong, 
so they have more propensities to pay develop cash 
dividends. However, because small-size companies are 
in the initial or middle periods of development, in order 
to enhance competition and increase market share, their 
stronger expanding desire depends on more capital, but 
their capital is not enough, and financing methods are less, 
so they usually trend not to pay cash dividends. Therefore, 
the following point comes into this article.  
H1: Company size is positively correlated with the 
propensity to pay cash dividends.
1.1.2  Cash Flow
The cash need to be used to pay cash dividends, so the 
listed companies have more confidence to pay cash 
dividends when they have enough circulating capitals 
and have no problem for their short-term liability. But the 
companies in a bad situation of cash flow don’t have the 
financial capability to pay cash dividends. If cash flow of 
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each stock shows negative value, the listed companies will 
have no way to pay cash dividends. Jensen (1993) thought 
that when listed companies had enough cash flow, it 
would cause over-investment due to accept the investment 
plan with negative net present value. In order to reduce 
operator’s over-investment and promote the corporate 
value, the listed companies will reduce their free cash 
flow by paying cash dividends. Therefore, the following 
point comes into this article.
H2: Cash flow of companies is positively correlated 
with the propensity to pay cash dividends.
1.1.3  Asset Liquidity
By researching, Liu et al (1997) thought that the asset 
liquidity impacted to make cash dividend policy of 
companies. Usually, the companies with strong asset 
liquidity mean that they have more current assets and less 
current liability. The more the company has asset liquidity, 
the stronger management and operation capabilities are, 
the less the company has requirement and dependence to 
the monetary fund, the more the monetary fund can be 
used to pay cash dividends. Therefore, the following point 
comes into this article.
H3: Liquidity is positively correlated with the 
propensity to pay cash dividends.
1.1.4  Investment Opportunity
The companies which are growing have lower profitability 
and more liability usually go to hunt for more investment 
opportunities. The available cash flow is less, so they 
need to retain cash and not to pay cash dividends. The 
investment of mature company is less, so the situation 
is opposite, they don’t need to keep more cash and they 
trend to pay cash dividends. The capital requirement of the 
listed companies is mainly including investment capital 
requirement and dividend payout, so more investment 
opportunities require more capital and need retain more 
profit, so that it must cut the capital requirement of cash 
dividend payout. Therefore, the following point comes 
into this article.
H4: Investment opportunity is negatively correlated 
with the propensity to pay cash dividends.
1.1.5  Profitability
Profitability impacts directly the current profit distribution 
and undistributed profit of the company. Profit is the 
main resource of cash dividend, so profitability is the 
most important influencing factor and basis (Michael et 
al, 1990; Graham and Bromson, 1992). Corporate value 
depends on the profitability, so usually the higher and 
more stable current and future profitability is, the more 
profit can be paid, then it makes the company have more 
confidence to keep the capability to pay cash dividends. 
The company hopes more to show their good management 
condition to the market by paying more cash dividends so 
as to keep their good image in the market. Usually to pay 
cash dividends means that the company managers are full 
of confidence to keep higher profit level and have enough 
cash to support cash dividend in the future. Oppositely, if 
the managers estimate that the future corporate profit is 
not ideal, then they can’t just pay. Therefore, the following 
point comes into this article.
H5: Profitability is positively correlated with the 
propensity to pay cash dividends.
1.1.6  Growth
Good-growth companies mean they have stronger growth 
ability, more requirements to develop market and expand 
business, so they usually don’t pay cash dividends for 
cash requirement. Due to more investment opportunities, 
the growing company need consider more about enterprise 
operation development and company size expansion in 
the future, so they retain the net profit but not pay cash 
dividends. Bad-growth and mature companies have the 
propensity to pay cash dividends because they need solve 
over-investment problem in one side, and they have more 
self-required fund stock and capital resources in the other 
side. In addition, growth opportunity can weaken the 
largest shareholder’s incentive to pay cash dividends, and 
promote the company to retain more cash for valuable 
investment opportunities. The largest shareholder can 
force the company to give the redundant free cash flow so 
as to increase investment in the high-growth companies, 
and to increase dividends in the low-growth companies. 
Therefore, the following point comes into this article.
H6: Growth is negatively correlated with the 
propensity to pay cash dividends
1.1.7  Debt Ratio
Debt ratio is relative with financial structure of companies. 
In the accounting policy, the company with high debt ratio 
trends to select the projects which can increase interests 
to improve the worsening financial structure, so the 
companies trend to retain profit to meet capital demand, 
then the capital for paying cash dividends will be reduced. 
If the companies still select to pay cash dividends, it 
will only make the financial situation worse, so the only 
choice of companies is not to pay. Many Chinese listed 
companies have over high debt ratio. It becomes a sign 
of corporate management worsening, so those companies 
wouldn’t like to distribute profit to make the financial 
situation much worse, but they would like to retain profit 
in the companies. Meanwhile, the creditors will force 
companies to limit profit to be used for their own interests 
when the financial situation is worsening. If the debt ratio 
is too high, creditors will require retaining profit and 
reducing to pay cash dividends. Therefore, the following 
point comes into this article.
H7: Debt ratio is negatively correlated with the 
propensity to pay cash dividends.
1.1.8  Stability of Dividend Policy
According to the client effect theory of dividend policy 
and stability theory of dividend policy, the cash dividend 
policy of companies in the previous year will attract 
the investors who prefer cash dividends, and improve 
180Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures 181
shareholders’ expectation to the cash dividends in the 
current year. In order to keep the stability of stock price, 
operators will keep performing current cash dividend 
policy. The reason is that it will cause to lower the 
investors’ attraction to make stock price unstable if not 
keeping on paying cash dividends. Therefore, level-
headed operators will keep on performing cash dividend 
policy to avoid the risk. But the types of dividend and 
dividend payout level before also have important influence 
on the current dividend policy. When the company makes 
the current-year dividend policy, they will consider the 
situation to pay dividends in the previous year to keep 
the dividend policy stable. Therefore, the following point 
comes into this article.
H8: Stability of dividend policy is positively correlated 
with the propensity to pay cash dividends.
1.2  Corporate Governance
The corporate governance decides the quality and 
developing level of listed companies basically. It solves 
the existed agency problem and impacts company 
decision-making, which impact cash dividend policy of 
companies. The corporate governance has 4 influencing 
factors mainly including the equity structure, structure 
of the board of directors, management compensation and 
legal environment. 
1.2.1 Equity Structure
Equity structure is the proportion of different-property 
stocks in the corporate shareholding equity and their 
correlation. It is the foundation of property right to the 
corporate governance. It includes equity concentration, 
equity attribute and equity circulation.
Equity concentration is whether there are controlling 
shareholders in the company. Its economic nature 
impacts the propensity to pay cash dividends of listed 
companies (Wang, 2007). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
also designated that the money from increase of stock 
price makes the minority shareholders’ interests trend 
to coincide when there are controlling shareholders in 
the company. Controlling shareholders have motivation 
and ability to pursue the maximization of corporate 
value, so it will produce certain control to the enterprise 
management level, and solve traditional agency problem 
to avoid “hitchhike” phenomenon in the situation of high 
equity decentralization. Bai (2005) thought that other 
shareholders’ share holding would have positive influence 
on corporate governance. When the company is in a bad 
management situation, the more concentrated the equity of 
those shareholders is, the more possible they strive for the 
control right or assist outsiders to fight for control right. 
In addition, those majority shareholders also can perform 
supervision to business management.
Comparing with the state-owned holding companies, 
usually it is easier for the non state-owned holding 
companies to control earnings through connected 
transaction, so all the non state-owned holding companies 
can get profits from companies in the enough methods. It 
makes them not share profit equally to all the shareholders 
in the method of cash dividend. Oppositely, the state-
owned holding companies prefer to get profits in the 
method of cash dividend. 
Most of the research shows that the shareholders 
holding tradable shares in Chinese capital market 
prefer to pursue stock dividends but not cash dividends. 
Tradable share ratio is negatively correlated with cash 
dividends. The more tradable share ratio the company 
has, the less possiblely the company pays cash dividends 
(Yang 2000; Wei and Jiang, 2001; Zhou and Zhu, 2006). 
In the dualistic system of equity structure, controlling 
shareholders’ shareholding cost is much lower than the 
shareholders holding tradable shares. Investment yield of 
the shareholders holding tradable shares is much lower 
than the shareholders holding non-tradable shares, so the 
shareholders holding tradable shares limit the behavior of 
cash-out of the shareholders holding non-tradable shares. 
Therefore, the following points come into this article. 
H9-1: Controlling shareholders is positively correlated 
with the propensity to pay cash dividends.
H9-2: State-owned holding is positively correlated 
with the propensity to pay cash dividends.
H9-3: Tradable shares ratio is negatively correlated 
with the propensity to pay cash dividends.
1.2.2  The Structure of Board of Directors
The board of directors is the important organ to guarantee 
the shareholders’ interests. The structure of board of 
directors has significant influence on cash dividend policy 
of companies. The structure characteristic of board of 
directors is mainly including the size of board of directors, 
proportion of independent directors and CEO duality.
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) thought the size of board of 
directors should be less than 10 people, and it is better to 
have 9 people to avoid “hitchhike” phenomenon and loss 
caused by insufficient coordination and communication. 
Luo (2006) thought that the management of Chinese listed 
companies nowadays was not perfect. It is no way for the 
small-size board of directors to maintain all shareholders’ 
interests, but not only maintain the majority shareholders’ 
interests. The large-size board of directors should be able 
to control the agency conflict efficiently. The large-size 
board of directors has resource advantage and provides 
cross-industry management and help to create the good 
external image and performance of company (Coles, 
2005). The large-size board of directors also can present 
various interests to avoid crony and to hire the competent 
outside directors, which are good for all communication 
and coordination. 
Independent director system is the important 
composition of the corporate governance structure today. 
Schellenger (1989) found that proportion of independent 
directors was positively correlated with cash dividend 
payout. Proportion increase of independent directors helps 
board of directors to participate strategies more because 
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independent directors can not only participate corporate 
decision but also from the power to influent decision. If 
the proportion of independent directors is higher, it will 
enhance the efficiency of supervision of board of directors 
to prevent the majority shareholders from abusing control 
right and increase the transparence of board of directors to 
ensure fairness in the board of directors. 
Molz (1988) thought that the board of directors 
controlled by corporate management can not perform their 
legal governance function. Jensen (1993) thought that 
when CEO is the president in the board of the directors, 
the board of the directors can’t perform their key function, 
as well as internal control system will be invalidated. At 
that time, CEO gets more power to control the board of 
directors. The independence of the board of directors is 
impacted. It will be more possible for CEO to pursue his 
own interests but not all shareholders’ interests. Xiang 
and Feng (2008) thought that currently internal control 
phenomenon in Chinese boards of directors was very 
obvious, which causes severe agency problem. Separated 
leadership can strengthen board of directors to corporate 
supervision beneficial to improve corporate performance. 
Therefore, the following points come into this article. 
H10-1: The size of board of directors is positively 
correlated with the propensity to pay cash dividends.
H10-2: The size of independent directors is the 
negatively correlated with the propensity to pay cash 
dividends.
H10-3: CEO duality is negatively correlated with the 
propensity to pay cash dividends.
1.2.3  Management Compensation
A reasonable  compensa t ion  sys tem can  insure 
management to make the maximization of shareholders’ 
interests as the target and connect the compensation to 
performance in order to release the conflicts of interests 
between management and shareholders. It solves the 
enterprise principal-agent problem in the large degree. 
With getting their compensation, the top-management 
has responsibility in the result from their decision. The 
top-management getting higher compensation will work 
harder. Comparing with the top-management getting 
less compensation, the top-management getting higher 
compensation will work harder and make investment 
decision more suitable to shareholders’ interests. In the 
research of compensation and corporate performance, 
Hotmstrom (1979) thought that there was high correlation 
between corporate performance and how hard agent 
works. The agent’s compensation and performance 
sensitivity should be higher. The members in management 
should have enough incentive and connect their income to 
service; otherwise you can’t expect that they can burden 
the task to make adaptable corporate policy. Therefore, 
the following point comes into this article. 
H11: The management compensation is positively 
correlated with the propensity to pay cash dividends.
1.2.4  Legal Environment 
In the research, La Porta et al (1998) found that good 
legal environment had evident effect in supervision 
to managers and protection to the investors. Although 
Chinese listed companies confronted the same Chinese 
legal environment. However, some companies are listing 
in other markets, so those companies had to submit 
the approved corporate financial report through strict 
audit, complying with the legal rules in that market. 
Thereby, such listed companies in other market at the 
same time will confront the more strict supervision from 
more investors. It is necessary to open their financial 
information and the high transparency. Honest managers 
can provide the information concerning corporate 
management situation, financial situation and external 
environment fully, correctly and in time. It can help to 
improve the corporate governance level. Therefore, the 
following point comes into this article. 
H12: Listing in other market is positively correlated 
with the propensity to pay cash dividends.     
2.  RESEARCH DESIGN
2.1  Definition of Variable
2.1.1  Explained Variable
The propensity to pay cash dividends (DIVIDEND): In 
the research, Deng (2005) thought that the proportion of 
companies performing cash dividend went up after 2000, 
which had obvious correlation with policy guidance, but 
the dividend per stock went down obviously. Whereas, 
the pre-tax dividend per stock is less than 0.05 RMB in 
many companies, which makes the investors get nothing 
almost. It means that the purpose of some companies to 
pay cash dividends is to meet the requirement of China 
Securities Regulatory Commission to share allotment and 
additional equity offer. According to this method, in this 
article, we see the companies which the dividend per stock 
is less than or equal to RMB 0.05 as the cash dividend 
undistributed company. That is to say when the annual 
cash dividend per stock is more than 0.05, it is equal to 1, 
and otherwise it is equal to 0.
2.2.2  Explanatory Variable
Financial characteristics:
(1) Company size (SIZE): express by total asset index 
and use the natural logarithm;
(2) Cash flow (CF): express by net cash flow index;
(3) Asset liquidity (LIQUID): express by the liquidity 
ratio index;
(4) Investment opportunity (IO): express by price-
earnings ratio index. The companies with higher price-
earnings ratio have more investment opportunity;
(5)  The  prof i tab i l i ty  (PROFIT) :  express  by 
undistributed profit index per stock. The more the index 
is, the stronger the profitability is;
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(6) Growth (Grow): express by growth rate of total 
assets. Growth rate of total assets = (annual total assets 
– total asset in the previous year)/average of total assets. 
The higher the index is, the higher growth is;
(7) Debt ratio (DEBT): express by asset debt ratio 
index;
(8) Stability of dividend policy (PREYEAR): express 
by the index whether pay cash dividends or not in the 
previous year, cash dividend in the previous year is equal 
to 1, otherwise, it is equal to 0.
Corporate governance: 
(9) Controlling shareholders (DUMBCS): According 
to the amount of the largest shareholder’s shareholding, 
confirm whether controlling shareholders exist or not. If 
the amount of the largest shareholder’s shareholding is 
over 30%, it is equal to 1, otherwise it is equal to 0; 
(10) State-owned stock (SP): According to the largest 
shareholder’s attribute, make sure if the state-owned 
holding exists. If the largest shareholder is state-owned 
stock, it is equal to 1; otherwise, it is equal to 0;
(11) Equity circulation (AL): express by proportion 
index of tradable shares;
(12) Size of the board of directors: express by the 
index of the number of people in the board of directors in 
the end of year;
(13) Independent directors scale (DR): express by the 
index of proportion of independent directors in the end of 
year, proportion of independent directors = the number of 
independent directors/ the number of people in the board 
of directors;
(14) CEO duality (CEO): select the variable that 
whether have CEO duality or not as the index, if have 
CEO duality, it is equal to 1, otherwise, it is equal to 0;
(15) Management compensation (EOR): express by 
the sum of first 3 top-managers’ compensation, and get its 
natural logarithm;
(16) Legal environment (HB): select the index whether 
listing in the other markets or not to measure. If listing in 
H or B stock market, it is equal to 1; otherwise, it is equal 
to 0. 
2.2  Test Model
In this article, we establish binary choice Logit model 
to test the influence of all factors to the propensity to 
pay cash dividends of the listed companies. Logit model 
is based on binary standard of the decision maker’s 
judgment to event occurrence probability. That is the 
explained variable Y always is equal to 1 or 0. When the 
tested event happened, make Y equal to 1. This model 
is efficient to test the correlation between the binary 
dependent variable and influencing factors. Furthermore, 
Logit model estimation is completed by the maximum 
likelihood function. In this article, as the different factors 
impacting the propensity to pay cash dividends, we 
establish different models in different sides of financial 
characteristics and corporate governance. See the details 
below: 
Financial characteristics model:
DIVIDEND = β iFinancial characteristics variable + 
γiContorl variable + Ci + εi                                                                                (1)
The detailed variables of financial characteristics 
include SIZE, CF, LIQUID, IO, PROFIT, GROW, DEBT 
and PREYEAR, the corresponding test models are 1-8, 
control variables include the corporate governance factor, 
industry factor and annual factor and C is the optional 
absolute term.
Corporate governance model:
DIVIDEND = βiCorporate governance variable + γicontrol 
variable + Ci + εi                                                                                                           (2)
The corporate  governance var iables  include 
DUMBCS, SP, AL, BSIZE, DR, CEO, EOR and HB, the 
corresponding test models are 9-17, and control variable 
includes financial characteristics factor, industry factor 
and annual factor. C is the optional absolute term.
2.3  Sample Selection and Data Resource 
In 2000, China Securities Regulatory Commission issued 
a regulation that if listed companies apply for share 
allotment or additional equity offer, they must pay cash 
dividends for 3 years. In 2001, a regulation was issued 
about the explanation of the phenomenon about not 
paying cash dividends of the listed companies for about 3 
years. Since 2001, the phenomenon that listed companies 
perform cash dividends has been increased. On the basis 
and data availability, the data of A-share listed companies 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2001 to 
2007 is finally selected to research in this article. On 
the basis of initial sample selection, the corresponding 
data processing is done in the article. The detailed 
principles include: (1) Due to the specialty of business 
in the financial industry, the data of listed companies in 
financial industry is deleted; (2) Delete the data of delisted 
companies as the sample for over 1 year; (3) Delete the 
data of companies of which lack more data and can’t 
complement the data when they are as the sample. Finally, 
1056 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock market from 2001 to 2007 are made as research 
objects in this article. The data of listed companies is 
from the data bases CSMAR, CCER and CCFR. Some 
lost data is gotten by looking up manually annual reports 
of the listed companies in every year. The annual reports 
are found in Stock Star (http://www.stockstar.com/). The 
software EVIEWS6.0 is used for measurement model 
process.
1This definition follows the regulations in Guidance for Articles of Association of Listed Companies made by China Securities Regulatory 
Commission.
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3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS  
3.1  Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics characteristics of variables in 
above models in the sample companies are shown in Table 
1. 
The description of statistics in Table 1 shows that 
DIVIDEND average is 0.359, which means that less than 
40% of the companies in the sample pay cash dividends 
in the current year. In the financial characteristics, 
SIZE average is 12.024, the maximum is 18.090, and 
the minimum is 4.948, which reflect that there are 
larger differences in the company size. CF average 
is 0.080, which shows that net cash flow per stock 
of listed companies is 0.080 RMB. LIQUID average 
is 1.548, which shows that general current assets of 
the listed companies can have some guarantee to the 
current liabilities. However, the maximum is 55.741, 
the minimum is 0.006, which shows that there are 
larger differences between the companies. IO standard 
difference is 2033.906. If the value is bigger, it means that 
investment opportunity decentralization of all companies 
is big. PROFIT average is 0.070, which shows that the 
general profitability of listed companies is not strong. 
GROW average is 0.0717 and standard deviation is 
39.535, which show growth data distribution discretization 
of listed companies. DEBT average is 0.558, which shows 
that the general debt ratio of listed companies is high. 
PREYEAR average is 0.376, which shows that less than 
40% of the companies in the sample pay cash dividends in 
the previous year. In the corporate governance, DUMBCS 
average is 0.637, which shows that there are controlling 
shareholders in more than 50% companies. SP average is 
0.672, which shows that the largest shareholders in more 
than 50% companies are state-owned shareholders. AL 
average is 0.442, which shows that the tradable shares of 
listed companies are not over 50% generally. The median 
of BSIZE is 9 and the median of DR is 0.333, which mean 
the average number of people in the board of directors 
in Chinese listed companies is 9 and the average number 
of independent directors is 3. CEO average is 0.882, 
which shows CEO duality between the president in the 
board of directors and general manager exists in many 
Chinese listed companies. The natural logarithm average 
of management compensation is 3.661. The maximum is 
7.544 and the minimum is 0.077, which show that there 
are bigger differences of top-management between the 
companies. HB average is 0.101, which shows that less 
listed companies in the sample list in other markets.  
In order to avoid the possible multicollinearity 
problem, the correlation test is made in this article. 
Through correlation test, the correlation coefficients 
among various variables are all small. The maximum 
one is not over 0.4, which proves that multicollinearity 
problem does not exist between various variables. It 
makes the model test results more reasonable. 
3.2  Regression Analysis
3.2.1  Regression Analysis on Financial Character
See Table 2 about regression result of binary choice Logit 
model of the financial characteristics.
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
 
                     Mean   Median   Std. Dev    Maximum     Minimum
DIVIDEND  0.359     0.000      0.480        1.000            0.000
SIZE     12.024   11.953      1.033      18.090            4.948
CF       0.080     0.018      0.660      15.515           -5.945
LIQUID       1.548     1.208      1.965      55.741            0.006
IO   111.394   36.514     2033.906     163103.4    -33865.55
PROFIT       0.070     0.212      1.107        5.379         -14.299
GROW       0.717     0.134    39.525     3305.750     -111.258
DEBT       0.588     0.507      1.881    124.022             0.008
PREYEAR    0.376     0.000      0.484        1.000             0.000
DUMBCS     0.637     1.000      0.481        1.000             0.000
SP       0.672     1.000      0.469        1.000             0.000
AL       0.442     0.416      0.145        1.000             0.028
BSIZE       9.652     9.000      2.279      24.000             2.000
DR       0.285     0.333      0.124        0.750             0.000
CEO       0.882     1.000      0.322        1.000             0.000
EOR       3.661     3.689      0.913        7.544             0.077
HB       0.101     0.000      0.301        1.000             0.000
In Table 2, it shows that Hosmer-Lemeshow(H-L)
value of the models can pass the test in 10% obvious 
level at least. It proves that there isn’t obvious difference 
between the actual value distribution and estimated value 
distribution of the explained variable, as well as the model 
fitting effect is better. Therefore, the results of regression 
models are believable with stronger explanatory power. 
For variables in details, except GROW, the influencing 
variables of financial characteristics can pass the test 
in 1% obvious level, which shows that the factors of 
financial characteristics have obvious effect on making 
cash dividend policy. The coefficient of Model 1 
SIZE is positive, which is the same as expected. H1 is 
verified, which means that the bigger total assets scale 
the companies have, the more they have the propensity 
to pay cash dividends. The coefficient of CF in Model 
2 is positive, which is same as expected. H2 is verified, 
which means that the more the cash flow per stock is, the 
more possiblely they pay cash dividends. The coefficient 
of LIQUID in Model 3 is positive, which is the same 
as expected. H3 is verified, which means the positive 
correlation between making cash dividend policy and asset 
liquidity. The coefficient of IO in Model 4 is negative, 
which is the same as expected. H4 is verified, which 
means the companies with high investment opportunities 
have the propensity not to pay cash dividends. The 
coefficient of PROFIT in Model 5 is positive, which 
is the same as expected. H5 is verified, which means 
that the stronger profitability the companies have, the 
more possibility they have to pay cash dividends. The 
coefficient of GROW in Model 6 is negative, which is 
the same as expected. H6 can’t be verified, which means 
that growth has uncertain influence on cash dividend 
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Table 3-a
The Logit Regression Results of the Financial Characteristics
          Model 1 Model 2          Model 3    Model 4               Model 5         Model 6   Model 7           Model 8
SIZE          0.61***       
         (0.0000)       
CF                    0.29***      
                   (0.0000)      
LIQUID                             0.05***     
                            (0.0004)     
IO                                         -0.00***    
                                          (0.0000)   
PROFIT                                                     1.81***   
                                                    (0.0000)   
GROW                                                                -0.00  
                                                                (0.4948)  
DEBT                                                                             -1.98*** 
                                                                             (0.0000) 
PREYEAR                                                                     0.22***
                                                                                     (0.0000)
DUMBCS        0.54***  0.37***           0.36***     0.38***              0.49***          0.37***    0.41***           0.37***
SP          0.27***  0.26***           0.25***      0.27***              0.39***          0.26***    0.20***           0.25***
AL          -2.20*** -3.80***         -3.81***    -3.79***             -2.79***          -3.78***   -0.86***           -3.82***
BSIZE          0.03**              -0.04***         -0.04***    -0.04***              0.06***         -0.04***    0.05***          -0.04***
DR          0.20                  -1.75***         -1.91***    -1.90***              0.32         -1.87***               0.08                -1.89***
CEO          0.13    -0.31**         -0.32***      0.29***              0.66***          0.50***    0.50***           0.49***
HB          -0.35***  0.20**          0.21**   -0.20**                -0.42***          0.19**   -0.04           0.20**
C        -10.11***    —             —                        —              -3.19***            —                    -1.86***              —
YEARi                                                                                                     Control
NDUj                                                                                                     Control
H-L        20.74∆∆∆             29.66∆∆∆        37.99∆∆∆  34.27∆∆∆             54.90∆∆∆        35.66∆∆∆   20.00∆∆∆         38.20∆∆∆
       (0.0079)             (0.0002)        (0.0000) (0.0000)             (0.0000)         (0.0000)    (0.0103)         (0.0001)
Table 3-b
The Logit Regression Results of Corporate Governance Factors
          Model 9 Model 10          Model 11    Model 12              Model 13         Model 14  Model 15        Model 16
DUMBCS        0.56***
                       (0.0000)
       
SP                    0.46***
                                                 (0.0000)      
AL                            -2.9***
                                                                           (0.0000)     
BSIZE                                        -0.06***    
                                        (0.0000)    
DR                                                     1.01***   
                                                    (0.0000)   
CEO                                                                 -0.19  
                                                                 (0.0264)  
EOR                                                                              0.37*** 
                                                                             (0.0000) 
HB                                                                                      0.37***
                                                                                     (0.0001)
SIZE                0.62***  0.36***           0.73***    0.64***               0.68***          0.10***    0.57***           0.08***
CF          0.17***  0.17***           0.17***    0.16***               0.18***          0.21***    0.16***           0.22***
LIQUID          -0.05***            -0.1***          -0.1***   -0.1***                -0.1***         -0.1***   -0.1***          -0.1***
To be continued
policy. The reason is that in one side, growth can bring 
more earnings required retaining, and in the other side, 
paying cash dividends must be done to meet the financing 
requirement. The coefficient of DEBT in Model 7 is 
negative, which is the same as expected. H7 is verified, 
which means the companies with high debt ratio have the 
propensity not to pay cash dividends. The coefficient of 
PREYEAR in Model 8 is positive, which is the same as 
expected. H8 is verified, which means dividend policy 
has stability. The companies paying cash dividends in 
the previous year have more probability to do it again in 
current year.
3.2.2  Regression Analysis on Corporate Governance
See Table 3 about regression result of binary choice Logit 
model of corporate governance.
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Continued
          Model 9 Model 10          Model 11   Model 12            Model 13         Model 14  Model 15        Model 16
IO          0.00*** -0.0***         -0.0***   -0.0***               0.0***         -0.0***    0.0***          -0.0***
PROFIT          1.31***            -1.33***         -1.40***   -1.30***               1.30***         -1.62***              1.22***          -1.65***
GROW          0.00                  -0.00         -0.00                     0.00               0.00         -0.00                    0.00          -0.00
DEBT         -3.7*** -3.9***         -3.8***   -3.9***              -4.0***         -3.9***  -4.4***          -3.8***
PREYEAR      0.18***  0.17***          0.17***    0.17***               0.17***          0.13***   0.16***           0.14***
C        -7.12***            -7.2***         -6.7***               -7.4***                -7.6***            —                   -7.2***              —
YEARi                                                                                                     Control
NDUj                                                                                                     Control
H-L        128∆∆∆                 116∆∆∆           99∆∆∆  106∆∆∆              126∆∆∆          135∆∆∆       82∆∆∆           131∆∆∆
       (0.0079)             (0.0002)        (0.0000) (0.0000)             (0.0000)         (0.0000)    (0.0000)         (0.0000)
In Table 3, it shows that the Hosmer-Lemeshow(H-L)
value of models 9-17 can pass the test in 1% obvious 
level at least. It proves that there isn’t obvious difference 
between the actual value distribution and estimated value 
distribution of the explained variable, as well as the model 
fitting effect is better. Therefore, the results of regression 
models are believable with stronger explanatory power.
The variables of corporate governance can pass the 
test in 10% obvious level at least, which shows that the 
factors have obvious effect to make cash dividend policy. 
In details, in the side of equity structure, the coefficient 
of DUMBCS in Model 9 is positive, which is the same 
as expected. H9-1 is verified, which means that the 
companies owning controlling shareholders have more 
propensity to pay cash dividends. The coefficient of SP in 
Model 10 is positive, which is the same as expected. H9-2 
is verified, which means that it is more possible to pay 
cash dividends when the largest shareholder is state-owned 
shareholder. The coefficient of AL in Model 11 is negative, 
which is the same as expected. H9-3 is verified, which 
means that Tradable share ratio is negatively correlated 
with making cash dividend policy. The coefficient of 
BSIZ in Model 12 is positive, which is the same as 
expected. H10-1 is verified, which means that the larger 
size of board of directors the listed companies have, the 
more they have propensity to make cash dividend policy. 
The coefficient of DR in Model 13 is positive, which is 
the same as expected. H10-2 is verified, which means 
that the bigger proportion of independent directors the 
companies have, the more probability they have to make 
cash dividend policy. The coefficient of CEO in Model 
14 is negative, which is the same as expected. H10-3 is 
verified, which means it is less possible for companies 
to make cash dividend policy when CEO duality exists. 
The coefficient of EOR in Model 15 is positive, which is 
the same as expected. H11 is verified, which means it is 
good for management to do better to meet the company 
interests if increasing management compensation. It will 
trend to issue cash dividend more. The coefficient of HB 
in Model 16 is positive, which is the same as expected. 
H12 is verified, which means companies listing in other 
markets have more propensity to pays cash dividends.
3.3  Stability Test
In order to test the stability of the conclusion above, 
the stability tests in this article are below: (1) Make the 
data of the companies whether they pay cash dividends 
standard. According to make whether paying dividends as 
explained variable, many Chinese learners still do some 
research on it (Huacheng Wang, etc. 2007). That is to say, 
if the company pay cash dividends in the current year, the 
variable is equal to 1, otherwise, it is equal to 0, in the 
explained variables. In this article, that explained variable 
is used to do regression test. The result shows that the 
stability test result of financial characteristics variables 
is the same as the original test’s result. Company size, 
cash flow, asset liquidity, profitability and cash dividends 
distribution in the previous year have the positive influence 
to make cash dividend policy. Investment opportunity 
and debt ratio have negative effect to make cash dividend 
policy. The test result of growth factors is the same as 
the original test’s result, which can’t be tested. It proves 
that growth factor has uncertain influence to make cash 
dividend policy of Chinese listed companies. Meanwhile, 
the test result of stability of corporate governance 
variables is basically the same as the original test’s result. 
Only test result of proportion of independent directors is 
different from the original test’s result. DR original test 
coefficient is positive, and test result of the stability is 
negative. It means that proportion of independent directors 
has influence on making cash dividend policy. That is 
because it is short time for Chinese listed companies 
to establish independent directors, and the number of 
independent directors is small, so independent directors 
don’t play the corresponding role. However, existence of 
controlling shareholders, state-owned shareholder as the 
largest shareholder, the size of the board of directors, top-
management compensation and listing in other markets 
are positively correlated with the propensity to pay cash 
dividends of companies. Tradable share ratio and duality 
between president of the board of directors and general 
manager are negatively correlated with the propensity 
to pay cash dividends of companies. (2) Estimate in the 
method of Probit. Binary choice models are commonly 
including Probit and Logit models. In this article, Logit 
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model is used in the original test, but big sample is 
adopted for test here, it can be thought that   also obeys 
standard normal distribution so Probit model is established 
to do stability test in this article. The result shows that the 
test results of variables of financial factors are the same as 
original tests’ results. GROW also can’t be verified, which 
proves further that growth factor has uncertain influence 
on making cash dividend policy. The stability tests of 
governance factors are the same as direct cash dividend 
distribution. Except DR factor, the test results of the other 
variables are the same as the original tests’ results. DR 
test result is opposite to the original test result also, which 
proves further independent director factor has uncertain 
influence on making cash dividend policy. On the basis 
of stability test, the conclusion mentioned above in this 
article is reliable.
RESEARCH CONCLUSION
In this article, we use binary choice Logit model, make 
the 1056 A-share Chinese listed companies in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen stock market from 2001 to 2007 as the 
sample, and make an empirical analysis on what influence 
of financial characteristics and corporate governance 
characteristics have on propensity to pay cash dividends 
of companies. In the correlation indexes of financial 
characteristics of companies, company size, cash flow, 
asset liquidity, profitability, as well as whether paying 
the cash dividends in the previous year are positively 
correlated with the propensity to pay cash dividends 
of companies. Investment opportunity and debt ratio 
are negatively correlated with the propensity to pay 
cash dividends. Growth has uncertain influence on 
the propensity to pay cash dividends. In the corporate 
governance characteristics, existence of controlling 
shareholders, state-owned shareholder as the largest 
shareholder, the size of the board of directors, top-
management compensation and listing factors in other 
markets are positively correlated with the propensity to 
pay cash dividends of companies. Tradable share ratio 
and CEO duality factor are negatively correlated with 
the propensity to pay cash dividends of companies. 
Independent director factor has uncertain influence on 
the propensity to pay cash dividends. In general, financial 
characteristics show that Chinese listed companies have 
the capability to pay cash dividends, but the corporate 
governance factors have negative influence on the cash 
dividend payment of listed companies
According to the empirical results and descriptions 
of statistic to the data above, it is thought that in the side 
of financial characteristics, all influencing factors have 
positive effect on making cash dividend policy of listed 
companies. The operation situation of listed companies 
can provide the basis to pay cash dividends. The factors 
of investment opportunity and debt ratio, which have 
negative influence on making cash dividend policy, 
actually don’t play more roles in the actual operation of 
Chinese listed companies. The averages of IO and DEBT 
are not big, which means that the general investment 
opportunity and debt ratio of listed companies are not 
high. In the other theoretical analysis, Growth factor with 
negative effect has uncertain influence on the empirical 
result. Therefore, it can be said that Chinese listed 
companies have the capability to pay cash dividends. 
That is to say they can do it. In the side of corporate 
governance, expect for the equity structure, other factors 
have inhibitory action on making cash dividend of 
the listed companies. If listing in other markets, it can 
promote listed companies to pay cash dividends, but the 
proportion of Chinese listed companies listing in other 
markets is only 10%. For instance, the board of directors 
of listed companies can’t play the corresponding roles, so 
even independent director factor has uncertain influence 
on making the cash dividend policy. Regarding CEO 
duality factor having negative effect on making cash 
dividend policy, 90% of listed companies have CEO 
duality. Therefore, it shows that Chinese listed companies 
aren’t willing to pay cash dividends. That is to say that 
they aren’t willing to do it.
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